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We introduce neighborhood eﬀects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of
statistical discrimination in labor markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation
and the likelihood and extent of statistical discrimination. As long as negative stereotypes
persist in the face of increasing integration, skill levels rise in the disadvantaged group and fall
in the advantaged group. If integration proceeds beyond some threshold, however, there can be a
qualitative change in the set of equilibria, with negative stereotypes becoming unsustainable and
skill levels in both groups changing signiﬁcantly. This change can work in either direction: skill
levels may rise in both groups, or fall in both groups. Which of these outcomes arises depends
on the population share of the disadvantaged group, and on the curvature of the relationship
between neighborhood quality and the costs of human capital accumulation.
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Stereotypes – beliefs about some unobservable (or yet to be observed) trait of an individual based
upon his membership in an identiﬁable group – are ubiquitous in economic and social interactions.
Ever since the pioneering work of Arrow (1972, 1973) and Phelps (1972) it has been recognized that
such stereotypes do not depend upon an active taste for discrimination and can be self-perpetuating
even in the absence of any intrinsic group diﬀerences. In these early papers, and in the subsequent
literature on what has come to be termed statistical discrimination, the stability of stereotypes arises
because relevant traits are only imperfectly observable at the individual level. This allows unequal
treatment based on ex-ante irrelevant group identities to emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
The contributions of Arrow and Phelps have spawned a considerable literature that explores
whether the well-documented disadvantages in labor market outcomes experienced by individuals
belonging to certain groups (such as racial and ethnic minorities or women) might be explained by
the prevalence of negative stereotypes amongst employers. There are two strands in this literature.
One follows Phelps (1972) in assuming that individual measures of productivity are noisier for
members of disadvantaged groups.1 The other, derived from Arrow (1973), does not assume such a
diﬀerence. Instead, the key insight is that a stereotype can inﬂuence the behavior of those subject
to it in ways that cause the belief to become self-fulﬁlling. So, for instance, if individuals from
certain groups perceive that employers hold negative stereotypes about their capabilities, and are
hence less likely to treat them favorably, their incentives to acquire human capital are diminished,
thereby reinforcing and perpetuating the employer beliefs.2
The view of human capital acquisition that is implicit in these latter papers is one of a largely
individual and autonomous process. The treatment that individuals anticipate in the labor market
does inﬂuence their perceived beneﬁts of acquiring human capital, but the costs of human capital
acquisition are assumed to be exogenously given at the individual level. This assumption goes
against the view, evident in both a range of theoretical papers as well as in a number of empirical
analyses, that human capital investment decisions are subject to a variety of interpersonal external-
ities.3 For instance, it is widely held that both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of acquiring
1Aigner and Cain (1977), Borjas and Goldberg (1979), Lundberg and Startz (1983) all present models of statistical
discrimination in labor market settings that share this feature.
2Coate and Loury (1993) and more recently, Moro and Norman (2003a, 2003b) are examples of papers in this
vein.
3Consider, for example, the following statement in Lucas (1988): “Human capital accumulation is a social activity,
involving groups of people in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation of physical capital.” Human capital-
1human capital vary with the social and economic milieu in which an individual operates, and in
particular, with the human capital of others with whom the individual associates, whether in the
family, the neighborhood, at school, or in the workplace. And the usual presumption is that these
interpersonal externalities take the form of positive complementarities – the higher the levels of
human capital of others in a group, the lower the costs of human capital acquisition are for each
individual within it.
If, indeed, local complementarities – what we loosely term neighborhood eﬀects – are im-
portant, the costs of human capital acquisition at the individual level can clearly no longer be
taken to be exogenous. Instead, these costs, and how they vary across groups, will be determined
endogenously in equilibrium along with labor market outcomes and human capital levels. This has
two important implications. First, the assumption, typical in the existing statistical discrimination
literature, that the within-group distribution of human capital acquisition costs is the same for all
groups can no longer be sustained, and the hypothesis that groups are ex-ante identical needs to
be recast at a more primitive level.4 Second, with the possibility of local human capital spillovers,
the level of segregation in the economy becomes salient. That is because the extent to which in-
dividuals from diﬀerent groups interact directly determines whether local human capital spillovers
are conﬁned within the boundaries of a group or extend across groups; and that in turn potentially
inﬂuences whether group-level asymmetries in human capital investment levels and labor market
outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium. Neither of these implications has been addressed in the
existing literature on statistical discrimination. In this paper we take a step towards ﬁlling that
gap.
based externalities, of course, feature prominently in endogenous growth models. Peer group eﬀects are also considered
in several models of endogenous community formation (see, among others, Arnott and Rowse (1987), De Bartolome
(1990) and especially Benabou (1993, 1996a, 1996b)). On the empirical front, numerous studies provide evidence
suggestive of a variety of peer group and neighborhood eﬀects, among them, Coleman et al. (1966), Summers and
Wolfe (1977), Henderson, Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978), Borjas (1995), and Ioannides (2001). However, there
remain important concerns about the robustness and signiﬁcance of this evidence. Manski (1991) expresses doubts
that such endogenous social eﬀects can plausibly be identiﬁed using the sorts of data that have typically been available,
and Kremer (1997) questions the empirical importance of such eﬀects in explaining stratiﬁcation.
4The hypothesis that group diﬀerences are not innate but result instead from disparate treatement in equilibrium
has been termed the axiom of anti-essentialism by Glenn Loury (2002). This is reﬂected in the ex ante equality of cost
functions across groups in standard statistical discrimination models. While we allow cost functions to diﬀer across
groups in equilibrium as a result of endogenous diﬀerences in neighborhood quality, the mapping from neighborhood
quality to cost functions is held to be the same for each group. Thus the anti-essentialist hypothesis is maintained
throughout this paper.
2We do so by incorporating neighborhood eﬀects into an otherwise standard model of statistical
discrimination. This allows us to explore the links between the level of segregation in the economy
(which we take to be a primitive) and the likelihood and extent of statistical discrimination. In the
presence of neighborhood eﬀects, there are potential human capital spillovers from the advantaged
group to the disadvantaged. The extent to which such spillovers arise depends on the degree of
intergroup contact at the neighborhood level. Increasing integration therefore tends to lower the
costs of human capital acquisition in the disadvantaged group while raising those in the advantaged
group. If integration proceeds far enough, however, it may result in a qualitative change in the
set of attainable equilibria, making it impossible for negative stereotypes to be sustained. In
this case a shift to symmetric treatment of groups is triggered, resulting in rapid and signiﬁcant
changes in skill levels. While this tends to equalize labor market outcomes across groups, it can
do so in one of two quite distinct ways. Depending on the population share of the disadvantaged
group and the strength and curvature of neighborhood eﬀects, the resulting shifts can leave both
groups better oﬀ or both groups worse oﬀ than under the status quo. This suggests that under
certain circumstances, both the advantaged and the disadvantaged group may be supportive of
vigorously pursued integrationist policies, while under other circumstances, both may be opposed.
More generally, the pursuit of integration, whether in the schools or in housing markets, may have
signiﬁcant and identiﬁable equity and eﬃciency eﬀects that extend well beyond the speciﬁca r e n a s
in which integrationist policies are attempted.
Our work is related to and complements a number of papers in several related areas. First and
most obviously, the paper is related to the important contributions of Coate and Loury (1993) and
Moro and Norman (2003a). These papers examine whether concerted public action in the form
of temporary aﬃrmative action programs can eliminate self-conﬁrming discriminatory stereotypes.
We investigate the related and as yet unexplored question of whether, starting from a situation
where statistical discrimination is prevalent, public eﬀorts towards greater integration of previously
segregated groups can eliminate negative stereotypes in labor markets.
A related literature addresses the eﬃciency implications of statistical discrimination. Schwab
(1986) is an early example while Norman (2003) provides the most recent and thorough analysis.
The central trade-oﬀ emphasized in Norman (2003) is the trade-oﬀ between the cost ineﬃciencies
i m p l i e db ys t a t i s t i c a ld i s c r i m i nation – individuals in the disadvantaged group who have low costs
of human capital acquisition choose not to invest, whereas higher cost individuals in the advantaged
group do – and the gains from better matching (of qualiﬁed individuals to jobs that require high
3levels of human capital and unqualiﬁed individuals to jobs that do not) possible under statistical
discrimination. We introduce an additional channel through which the elimination of negative
stereotypes may aﬀect eﬃciency. And that is through local human capital spillovers and whether
these spillovers operate asymmetrically on individuals with high and low levels of human capital.
We show that the likelihood, extent and eﬃciency implications of statistical discrimination de-
pend critically on the strength and direction of any asymmetries in the impact of neighborhood
eﬀects. These results echo those in the literature on endogenous community structure and strati-
ﬁcation – the work of Benabou (1993, 1996a, 1996b) being a prominent example – where such
asymmetric eﬀects are shown to matter for the extent and eﬃciency implications of stratiﬁcation.
The paper also complements the work of Sethi and Somanathan (2002), which explores the conse-
quences of income inequality for residential segregation. We take the converse approach, starting
with a given level of segregation, and explore the implications for inequality in the form of statistical
discrimination.
Finally, Moro and Norman (2003b) criticize standard statistical discrimination models on the
grounds that these models assume that human capital investment decisions of individuals from
diﬀerent groups are separable. The assumed separability has the somewhat implausible – from a
positive political economy perspective – implication that the privileged group has no incentive to
preserve negative stereotypes, or equivalently, has no incentive to resist public eﬀorts to eliminate
negative stereotypes. To address this shortcoming, Moro and Norman (2003b) adopt a more gen-
eral production technology under which they obtain cross-group eﬀects operating through wages
and job assignments in general equilibrium. In our case cross-group eﬀects arise through human
capital spillovers in neighborhoods (or more broadly networks and other social settings). And as a
consequence, the advantaged group may have an incentive to resist integration.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out a benchmark
model of statistical discrimination. In Section 3 we incorporate neighborhood eﬀects into this
benchmark model and provide a preliminary analysis of statistical discrimination in the presence
of neighborhood eﬀects, ﬁrst under complete segregation, and then, under partial integration. We
also present a couple of numerical examples that illustrate how, within this set-up, integration on
a large-enough scale can qualitatively change the set of attainable equilibria. Sections 4 and 5
5Benabou (1993) combines the local spillovers that we focus on in our paper, with the global interactions resulting
from production complementarities that are the focus of Moro and Norman (2003b), but does so in a framework
where individual human capital is perfectly observable.
4contain our main results, presented more formally. In Section 4 we discuss the conditions under
which, starting from a discriminatory equilibrium, integration on a large enough scale can eliminate
negative stereotypes. Section 5 follows with a discussion of the conditions under which integration
and the consequent elimination of statistical discrimination is likely to be welfare-improving, and
Section 6 concludes.
2 A benchmark model of statistical discrimination
2.1 The basic setup
Consider the following variant of the Coate and Loury (1993) model. There are two groups of
workers, 1 and 2, and group membership is costlessly observable. Workers may pay a cost to
become qualiﬁed, or may remain unqualiﬁed. This cost should be interpreted as being a net cost,
taking into account any intrinsic beneﬁts that may be derived from education. The distribution of
costs within each group is given by the distribution function F(c), which denotes the proportion
of workers with cost below c. We allow for the possibility that F(0) > 0,n a m e l yt h a tt h e r ee x i s t
some individuals for whom the intrinsic beneﬁt from acquiring human capital exceeds the cost of
doing so. The cost distributions are the same for each group.6
Firms may assign workers to one of two jobs. One of these may be done equally well by qualiﬁed
and unqualiﬁed workers, and results in zero payoﬀst ob o t hﬁrms and workers. The other yields a
positive aggregate payoﬀ xq if a qualiﬁed worker is assigned, and a negative payoﬀ xu otherwise.
Nothing essential is lost by setting xq =1and xu = −1.
Let si be the proportion of workers in group i w h oc h o o s et ob e c o m eq u a l i ﬁed. Firms can
observe these population proportions but cannot observe individual characteristics of workers prior
to assignment. They observe a noisy signal which can take one of two values: P (positive) or
N (negative). The probability that this signal is P when the worker is qualiﬁed is p,a n dt h e
probability that this signal is P when the worker is unqualiﬁed is q<p .




psi + q(1 − si)
(1)
Similarly, when a ﬁrm observes an N worker belonging to group i, the posterior probability that
6The assumption of identical cost distributions is relaxed when we consider neighborhood eﬀects below.
5the worker is qualiﬁed is
ϕ(si)=
(1 − p)si
(1 − p)si +( 1− q)(1− si)
(2)
Since p>q ,θ (si) >ϕ (si) for all si ∈ (0,1). Firms will assign workers to the skilled task if the
expected payoﬀ is positive. For a P worker, this requires
2θ(si) − 1 > 0
Similarly, for N workers to be allocated to the skilled tasks
2ϕ(si) − 1 > 0
Assume that workers get the entire surplus thus generated (this requires that P workers get paid
more than N workers if both are assigned to the skilled task). Hence wages are
wp(si)=m a x {2θ(si) − 1,0}
wn(si)=m a x {2ϕ(si) − 1,0}
Here it is being assumed that wages can depend on worker type as well as the signal, which would
show up as discrimination in a standard wage regression. But in equilibrium (see below) it will
never be the case that workers with the same test result and job assignment will receive diﬀerent
wages. Firms will assign workers to jobs on the basis of the population composition.
A worker will wish to become skilled if doing so would yield an expected increase in the wage
that exceeds the cost of becoming skilled. Hence a worker with cost c in group i will derive a
positive net beneﬁt from investing if and only if
pwp(si)+( 1− p)wn(si) − c>q w p(si)+( 1− q)wn(si)
which simpliﬁes to yield
(p − q)(wp(si) − wn(si)) >c .
Let b(si)=( p − q)(wp(si) − wn(si)) denote the expected beneﬁts of investing when the skill share
in group i is si.
In any group with skill share si, assuming that the workers who are skilled have lower costs
than those who are not, the cost of becoming skilled for the marginal worker is given by F−1(si).
This marginal worker will wish to become skilled if and only if the beneﬁts b(si) from doing so
exceed this cost. Equilibria correspond to states si for which b(si)=c(si), where c(si)=F−1(si)
is the cost of becoming skilled for the ‘marginal’ worker.
6It can be shown that there exist three ranges for the skill share si such that (i) all workers are
assigned to the low-skill task, regardless of signal, for si in the lowest range (ii) workers are assigned
to the high-skill job if and only if they have a positive signal value for si in the intermediate range,
and (iii) all workers are assigned to the high-skill task, regardless of signal, for si in the highest
range. In the last case, workers with a positive signal value earn more than those with a negative
signal value. These considerations imply that b(s) is single-peaked, takes its maximum at some
interior value of s, and b(s)=0for s suﬃciently small. These general properties are depicted in
Figure 1, which also depicts a cost function c(s).7
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Figure 1. An Equilibrium with Negative Stereotypes
Consider ﬁrst the case of symmetric stable equilibria s1 = s2 (in which both groups acquire
identical levels of human capital and receive equal labor market treatment). If F(0) is suﬃciently
small (so that relatively few individuals derive intrinsic beneﬁts from becoming qualiﬁed), then
7The ﬁgure is based on the following speciﬁcation: p =0 .8,q=0 .2, and costs are distributed uniformly with
support [−ε,γ − ε], where ε =0 .05 and γ =0 .6.
7there will exist a stable equilibrium in which all workers are assigned to the low-skill task. There
may, however, exist other symmetric equilibria. In the example of Figure 1, there are symmetric
equilibria at (sl,s l) and (sh,s h).8
When multiple symmetric equilibria exist, there also exist asymmetric equilibria in which mem-
bers of diﬀerent groups receive diﬀerent labor market treatment and make diﬀerent human capital
decisions. In the example of Figure 1, an equilibrium (sl,s h) with negative stereotypes about work-
ers in group 1 exists. Here ex-ante identical workers end up with diﬀerent levels of human capital.
This captures an essential feature of statistical discrimination and its potential consequences when
human capital choices are endogenous.
2.2 Stability
When multiple equilibria exist (as in Figure 1), not all of them will be dynamically stable. In order
to identify stable equilibria, we need to specify the dynamics of skill shares under conditions of
disequilibrium. It is natural to assume that at any skill proﬁle (s1,s 2), the skill share in group i
will rise if and only if the beneﬁts of skill acquisition exceed the costs for the marginal worker. We
adopt the following simple speciﬁcation:9
˙ si = b(si) − c(si).
Since human capital decisions, once made, are seldom reversible, the disequilibrium dynamics of
skill shares should be interpreted as arising from the exit of older workers and the entry of younger
ones into the labor market, as in Akerlof (1976).
In the absence of neighborhood eﬀects the dynamics of skill shares in the two populations are
independent and the stability of any equilibrium skill proﬁle (s1,s 2) requires only that for each si,
the slope of the cost function exceed that of the beneﬁt function at the equilibrium. In the example
of Figure 1, any skill proﬁle in which si ∈ {sl,s h} for each i is a stable equilibrium. Hence there
are four stable equilibria, of which two involve statistical discrimination.
In the presence of neighborhood eﬀects the stability of equilibria is less easy to determine, since
the cost distribution in each group depends on the skill acquisition in the other group as well as
the level of neighborhood integration. This case is treated in Section 3 below.
8There is also a third symmetric equilibrium with intermediate levels of skill acquisition but this will be unstable
in a sense to be made precise below.
9Any speciﬁcation ˙ si = f(b(si) − c(si)) with f(0) = 0, and f strictly increasing and Lipschitz continuous would
leave our results intact.
82.3 The linear cost case
Conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria are easily obtained in the special case of a linear
(marginal) cost function. Suppose costs are distributed uniformly on the interval [−ε,γ −ε], where
0 <ε<γ .In this case the distribution function is F(c)=( c + ε)/γ and if the population share
of workers who acquire skills is s, then the cost of skill acquisition for the marginal worker is
c(s)=γs− ε.
Deﬁne sx as the threshold level of skill acquisition at which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between placing
a worker with a positive signal in a skilled job versus an unskilled one. Speciﬁcally sx is deﬁned by





If c(sx) > 0, there will exist an equilibrium in which a share ε/γ of workers acquire skills and all
workers are placed in unskilled jobs. The workers who acquire skills are precisely those whose costs




denote the threshold value of the cost function parameter at which c(sx)=0 . Then a low-skill
equilibrium will exist whenever γ>γ x. It is easy to verify that there can be at most one such
equilibrium and that it must be stable.
We shall say that a high-skill equilibrium exists if there is some s such that b(s)=c(s) > 0.
Deﬁne sy as the level of skill acquisition at which (b(s)+ε)/s is maximized. It is easily veriﬁed
that there exists a unique sy and that θ(sy) > 1
2 >ϕ (sy). In other words, when a share sy of the
population acquire skills, workers are placed in skilled jobs if and only if their signals are positive.
Hence b(sy)=( p − q)wp(sy), and
sy =a r gm a x
(p − q)(2θ(s) − 1) + ε
s
.
Deﬁne γy as the cost parameter at which b(sy)=c(sy). Speciﬁcally, γy =( b(sy)+ε)/sy. Then
a stable high-skill equilibrium exists if and only if γ<γ y. The number of high-skill equilibria
must be either zero or two, and in the case of the latter, exactly one of them will be stable.
Although it is possible to get closed-form solutions for sy and γy in terms of the parameters p, q,
and ε, these expressions are cumbersome and are omitted here. Figure 2 illustrates geometrically





































































xs -  ε
γ
ys -  ε
Figure 2. Cost Distributions Consistent with Statistical Discrimination
As is evident from the ﬁgure, an equilibrium with statistical discrimination exists if and only
if γ ∈ (γx,γy). The costs of skill acquisition must be neither too great nor too small. If they are
too small, then there will be a unique symmetric high-skill equilibrium. If they are too large, there
will be a unique symmetric low-skill equilibrium. In an intermediate range, multiple symmetric
equilibria and hence also asymmetric equilibria can arise.
For future reference, we deﬁne sw and sz as follows. Let sz >s x be the larger solution to
sγx − ε = b(s),a n dl e tsw <s x be the smaller solution to sγy − ε = b(s),a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e
2. When there exists a stable equilibrium (sl,s h) with statistical discrimination in this baseline
model, it must be the case that sl ∈ [sw,s x] and sh ∈ [sy,s z]. Once we allow for neighborhood
eﬀects, however, asymmetric equilibria can lie outside this range.
103 Incorporating neighborhood eﬀects
The model above is based on the assumption, standard in the statistical discrimination literature,
that the ex-ante costs of acquiring human capital are exogenously given and are the same for both
groups. But if an asymmetric equilibrium is selected, then this assumption itself becomes diﬃcult
to sustain. Costs of becoming skilled will generally depend on the extent to which one’s family
members and neighbors have made prior investments in human capital. This in turn will depend
on the extent of intergroup contact.
To address this, let β denote the share of the population belonging to group 1. The mean skill
share in the population is then ¯ s = βs1 +(1−β)s2. Let σi be the mean neighborhood skill level for
individuals in group i (the share of their neighbors who become skilled).10 When the groups are
completely segregated and have no contact with each other, the mean skill share experienced by
each group will simply be given by σi = si. On the other hand, under complete integration, each
group would experience the same neighborhood skill share, which in turn would equal that in the
population as a whole: σ1 = σ2 =¯ s. These are the two extremes within which neighborhood skill
shares will lie for intermediate levels of segregation. We use the parameter d ∈ [0,1] to represent
the extent of segregation and specify
σi(s)=dsi +( 1− d)¯ s.
Lower values of d correspond to greater integration and hence a smaller distance between the
neighborhood skill shares experienced by members of the two groups.11
We now generalize the determination of costs to allow for neighborhood eﬀects. Let G(c,σ)
denote the proportion of individuals with costs below c in a group with mean neighborhood skill
level σ. Positive spillovers from human capital accumulation at the neighborhood level are reﬂected
in the assumption that G is increasing in σ. Although the costs of human capital accumulation may
now diﬀer across groups which experience diﬀerent levels of neighborhood quality, it is assumed that
the function G is identical across groups. Hence groups are not assumed to be innately diﬀerent
10We use the term “neighborhood” loosely to indicate the set of people that individuals from group i associate
with. Since residential proximity is one of several possible axes along which individuals interact, this may, but need
not, coincide with a literal interpretation of neighborhoods in spatial terms.
11The parameter d is closely related to the index of dissimilarity commonly used in empirical studies of segregation.
The index ranges between 0 and 1, and measures departures from a perfectly even distribution of the population
across neighborhoods.
11in any sense. Let c(s,σ) denote the cost of becoming skilled for the marginal worker, when this
worker experiences neighborhood quality σ and belongs to a group with skill share s.
3.1 Complete segregation
Neighborhood eﬀects make statistical discrimination more likely to occur if the groups are seg-
regated, since human capital spillovers are absent. Under complete segregation, each of the two
groups can be analyzed independently. As before, suppose that costs are uniformly distributed on
the interval [−ε,γ − ε], but with variable support γ = γ(σ). Higher neighborhood quality results
in lower costs of human capital accumulation, so γ(σ) is assumed to be strictly decreasing. The
implied cost function is c(s,σ)=sγ(σ) − ε. Under complete segregation, σi = si for i =1 ,2, so
equilibrium requires that for each group, c(si,s i)=b(si). Even though the cost function is linear
for any given level of neighborhood quality, the function c(s,s) will be nonlinear in s, reﬂecting the
fact that changes in neighborhood quality aﬀect the distribution of costs.
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Figure 3. Statistical Discrimination under Complete Segregation
12An equilibrium (sl,s h) with statistical discrimination under complete segregation is shown
in Figure 3. Suﬃcient conditions for statistical discrimination under complete segregation are
c(sx,s x) > 0 and c(sy,s y) <b (sy), where sx and sy are as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 . 3( s e ea l s oF i g -
ure 2). The ﬁrst of these implies sxγ(sx) − ε>0 or γ(sx) >ε / s x = γx. The second implies
b(sy) >s yγ(sy) − ε or γ(sy) < (b(sy)+ε)/sy = γy. Hence with neighborhood eﬀects, a stable
equilibrium with statistical discrimination exists under complete segregation if γ(sx) >γ x and
γ(sy) <γ y. Note that these conditions are not necessary. As before, if costs are neither too high
nor too low in the relevant range, multiple equilibria will exist under complete segregation.
If a stable equilibrium with statistical discrimination exists under complete segregation, then
t h e r em u s te x i s tmultiple stable symmetric equilibria (with no statistical discrimination) at all
levels of segregation.12
Proposition 1. The skill proﬁle (sl,s h) is an equilibrium with d =1if and only if (sl,s l) and
(sh,s h) are both equilibria for all d ∈ [0,1].
Hence there exists an equilibrium with statistical discrimination under complete segregation if and
only if there exist multiple equilibria without statistical discrimination at all levels of segregation.
We shall assume in the remainder of the paper that there exists an equilibrium with statistical
discrimination under complete segregation and hence that there exist (at least) two symmetric
equilibria (sl,s l) and (sh,s h) at all levels of segregation. This does not, of course, imply that there
exists an asymmetric equilibrium at all levels of segregation. As we show below, there may exist a
range of segregation levels at which no asymmetric equilibria exist, even in the presence of multiple
symmetric equilibria.
3.2 Partial integration
When some degree of integration exists, the dynamics of skill shares are no longer independent in
the two populations, since we have
˙ si = b(si) − c(si,σi)=b(si) − c(si,ds i +( 1− d)(βs1 +( 1− β)s2))
so ˙ si depends on both s1 and s2.
Any curve in (s1,s 2) space along which ˙ s1 =0is an isocline corresponding to the state variable
s1. Similarly the isoclines corresponding to the state variable s2 are curves in (s1,s 2) space along
12Proofs of all formal results are collected in the Appendix
13which ˙ s2 =0 . All isoclines for a particular numerical example with partial integration are shown in
Figure 4. The three ﬂatter curves correspond to ˙ s2 =0 , while the three steeper ones represent all
points at which ˙ s1 =0 . Any intersection of two isoclines corresponds to an equilibrium of the model
(and a rest point of the dynamics). The arrows describe the direction in which s1 and s2 change in
each of the sixteen regions of the state space. As in the example of Figure 1, there are four stable



























































Figure 4. Isoclines and Stable Equilibria with Neighborhood Eﬀects.
Of the four stable equilibria depicted in Figure 4, two are symmetric and two asymmetric. Of
the latter, there is one in which the ﬁrst group is disadvantaged and one in which it is advantaged.
When speaking of equilibria with statistical discrimination in the remainder of this paper, we
shall assume that the ﬁrst group is disadvantaged, and denote the equilibrium (sl,s h) with the
understanding that sl <s h.13 Furthermore, we shall assume that at most one stable equilibrium
13This is without loss of generality because equilibria are invariant to a relabeling of groups provided that the
14with this property exists.14
3.3 A ﬁr s tl o o ka tt h ee ﬀects of integration
Starting from a state (sl,s h) in which statistical equilibrium prevails, the eﬀects of increasing
integration on the human capital of the two groups will depend on whether or not integration leaves
intact the qualitative properties of the set of equilibria. Suppose, for instance, that the economy is
initially at the asymmetric equilibrium in the northwest corner of Figure 4, where the population
1 has lower skill levels. A decline in segregation, holding constant the two skill shares, will result
in improved neighborhood quality for the disadvantaged group and worsened neighborhood quality
for the advantaged group. At the original skill shares the result would be c(s1,σ1) <b (s1) and
c(s2,σ2) >b (s2), implying ˙ s1 > 0 > ˙ s2. Assuming that the change in integration leaves intact the
qualitative properties of the system (so that there remains an asymmetric equilibrium in which the
ﬁrst group is disadvantaged), the skill share will rise in the ﬁrst group and fall in the second. This
can be stated formally as follows.
Proposition 2. Consider all values of d such that an asymmetric equilibrium (sl,s h) exists. Then
sl is strictly increasing in d, while sh is strictly decreasing in d.
Hence increasing integration, if it allows negative stereotypes to persist, will raise human capital
levels in the disadvantaged group and lower them in the advantaged group. In this case small
increases in integration beneﬁt one group at the expense of the other but do so continuously. It
is possible, however, that there exists a level of integration above which negative stereotypes are
simply inconsistent with equilibrium. As integration proceeds beyond this critical bifurcation value,
there is a qualitative change in the equilibrium properties of the model. In this case a small change
in integration can result in a large and discontinuous shift in equilibrium skill levels. Since only
symmetric equilibria remain, the economy must converge to a state in which both groups receive
equal treatment. This leaves open the question of which of the two symmetric equilibria are reached.
An example is shown in Figure 5, which shows the phase diagrams corresponding to four diﬀerent
segregation levels. In this example, integration eliminates negative stereotypes but results in a shift
population share β is replaced with 1 − β.
14The assumption that at most one stable equilibrium with statistical discrimination against the ﬁrst group exists is
consistent with as many as nine equilibria in the model as a whole (as in Figure 4), and is therefore quite unrestrictive.
It is possible to obtain (but cumbersome to express) suﬃcient conditions on the primitives of the model that would
guarantee this.
15to the less eﬃcient symmetric equilibrium. Hence the skill shares of both groups decline relative
to the initial state in which negative stereotypes exist. Integration in this case raises the human
capital of the disadvantaged group only until the bifurcation point, after which the skill shares of
both groups collapse to levels below those at any asymmetric equilibrium. Equal treatment comes


































































































































Figure 5. Integration Eliminates Negative Stereotpes but Lowers Skill Levels.
Integration can also eliminate negative stereotypes and result in increases in the human capital
and welfare of both groups. An example of this is depicted in Figure 6. As before, there is a
bifurcation point at which the equilibrium properties of the system undergo a qualitative change,
and negative stereotypes become inconsistent with equilibrium. But, unlike the previous example,
this time the economy is pushed into the basin of attraction of the symmetric equilibrium in
which both groups have skill shares sh. In this case, as long as integration proceeds beyond the
critical threshold, it raises the skill levels of both groups relative to the initial state with negative
16stereotypes. Even the group which is advantaged under statistical discrimination can beneﬁtf r o m













































































Figure 6. Integration Eliminates Negative Stereotypes and Raises Skill Levels.
These two examples illustrate not only that integration can eliminate negative stereotypes, but
that its eﬃciency implications may depend in critical ways on underlying parameters. In the next
section we identify conditions under which the elimination of negative stereotypes is eﬃciency-
enhancing, and those in which it is eﬃciency-reducing. It turns out that the population share of
the disadvantaged group, as well as the strength and curvature of neighborhood eﬀects are critical
in this regard.
4 Can integration eliminate negative stereotypes?
We shall say that integration eliminates negative stereotypes if there exists ˜ d ∈ (0,1) such that
asymmetric equilibria exist if and only if d ≥ ˜ d. If there exists no such ˜ d, then either discrimination
17can persist even under complete integration or cannot arise under any level of segregation. If
integration eliminates negative stereotypes it triggers a shift from an asymmetric equilibrium to a
symmetric one. As noted above, this shift can reduce skill shares in both population, or raise them
in both populations.
Whether or not integration can eliminate negative stereotypes depends on both the population
share of the disadvantaged group as well as the curvature of the relationship between neighborhood
quality and the costs of human capital acquisition. In order to identify these eﬀects analytically,
we adopt a simple speciﬁcation for costs. As in Section 2.2, suppose that costs are uniformly
distributed with support [−ε,γ − ε], so that the distribution function is F(c)=( c + ε)/γ. If
as h a r es of workers acquire skills, then the cost of skill acquisition for the marginal worker is
c(s)=γs− ε. The parameter γ depends on neighborhood quality σ, and positive spillovers from
human capital accumulation imply that γ(σ) is strictly decreasing. We assume that the slope γ of
the cost function depends on the neighborhood skill share σ as follows
γ(σ)=¯ γ − σa.
The parameter a, assumed to be strictly positive, captures the curvature of the relationship between
σ and γ.When a =1the relationship is linear and the manner in which neighborhood quality aﬀects
costs is not sensitive to the initial neighborhood skill level. When a>1, increases in neighborhood
skill level result have their sharpest eﬀect on costs when the initial skill level is already high. When
the initial neighborhood skill level is low, improvements in neighborhood quality have negligible
eﬀects on the cost of human capital acquisition. When a<1 on the other hand, the opposite is
true: improvements in neighborhood quality have their sharpest eﬀect on costs when the initial
neighborhood quality is low. In communities with initially high skill levels, further improvements
in neighborhood quality have a negligible impact on costs. Intuitively, integration will favor the
disadvantaged community most (and hurt the advantaged group least) when the parameter a is
small.
In general there may exist values of a such that equilibria with statistical discrimination cannot
exist even under complete segregation. This can happen when a is suﬃciently small (in which
case both groups will have high levels of human capital in the unique symmetric equilibrium) or
when a is suﬃciently large (in which case both groups will have low levels of human capital in
the unique symmetric equilibrium). Let amin and amax be deﬁned, respectively, as the lower and
upper bounds for a such that stable equilibria with statistical discrimination exist under complete
18segregation. In terms of the model’s primitives, amin is the supremum of the set of values of a such
that c(s,s)=b(s) has a unique solution s>s x. Similarly amax is the inﬁmum of the set of values
of a such that c(s,s)=b(s) has a unique solution s<s x. Since the cost function c(s,s) is strictly
increasing in a for all s ∈ (0,1),t h ei n t e r v a l[amin,a max] ⊂ [0,1] is uniquely deﬁned. We shall
assume that amin <a max, without which equilibrium statistical discrimination would be impossible
f o ra n yp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
By deﬁnition, for any a ∈ (amin,a max) there exists an asymmetric equilibrium (sl,s h) with
s1 <s 2 when d =1 . A sn o t e di nP r o p o s i t i o n1a b o v e ,sl is increasing and sh is decreasing in d.
Integration, if it allows negative stereotypes to persist, will lead to greater skill accumulation in
the disadvantaged group and less in the advantaged group. The result is therefore a narrowing of
group inequality. It can further be shown that as long as negative stereotypes persist, both sl and
sh are decreasing in β and a.15 If the disadvantaged group’s population share rises, both groups
accumulate lower levels of human capital in equilibrium. This is a consequence of the fact that a
rise in the population share of the disadvantaged group lowers neighborhood skill shares for both
groups (as long as segregation is not complete). This raises the costs of skill acquisition and shifts
the equilibrium in the intuitive direction. A rise in a also lowers skill shares of both groups because
it reduces the beneﬁts of contact with the advantaged group for the initially disadvantaged, while
increasing the costs of contact with the disadvantaged group for the initially advantaged. Both
eﬀects result in lower equilibrium skill shares in each group.
Note that these comparative statics apply only if statistical discrimination persists in the face of
parameter changes. As shown in the previous section, however, greater integration can make neg-
ative stereotypes unsustainable in equilibrium if it proceeds beyond some threshold. The following
result establishes conditions under which this can occur
Theorem 1. For any β ∈ (0,1), there exist am,a n ∈ (amin,a max) such that integration eliminates
negative stereotypes for all a ∈ (amin,a m) ∪ (an,a max). Both am and an are decreasing in β.
Hence integration can eliminate negative stereotypes for any population composition provided that
the beneﬁts of integration in low skill neighborhoods is suﬃciently large relative to the costs in
high skill neighborhoods, or alternatively, provided that the beneﬁts of integration in low skill
n e i g h b o r h o o d si ss u ﬃciently small relative to the costs in high skill neighborhoods. The threshold
15See the proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
19values am(β) and an(β) are both decreasing in β. The result is illustrated for a particular numerical
speciﬁcation of the model in Figure 7. The shaded regions of the ﬁgure represent the parameter
ranges for which integration eliminates negative stereotypes.
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Figure 7. Parameter Range for which Integration Eliminates Negative Stereotypes
Theorem 1 implies that for any value of a between am(1) and an(0), there exists a range of
values of β such that integration eliminates negative stereotypes. Speciﬁcally, the following is a
Corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For any a ∈ (am(1),a m(0)) there exists βl > 0 such that integration eliminates
negative stereotypes if β ∈ (0,βl), and for any a ∈ (an(1),a n(0)) there exists βh < 1 such that
integration eliminates negative stereotypes if β ∈ (βh,1).
Hence integration can eliminate negative stereotypes if the population share of the disadvantaged
group is suﬃciently small, provided also that the beneﬁts of integration to the disadvantaged are
20suﬃciently large relative to the costs to the advantaged. It is also the case that integration can
eliminate negative stereotypes if the population share of the disadvantaged group is suﬃciently
large, provided also that the beneﬁts of integration to the disadvantaged are suﬃciently small
relative to the costs to the advantaged. Note that it is possible for an(1) to be strictly smaller than
am(0), as in the example of Figure 7. In this case there will exists values of a (between the dashed
lines in the ﬁgure) for which integration eliminates negative stereotypes if the population share of
either group is suﬃciently small.
5 Is integration welfare-enhancing?
From the perspective of horizontal equity, the elimination of negative stereotypes is, by deﬁnition, a
good thing. And as we showed in the previous section, integration on a large enough scale can result
in the elimination of negative stereotypes. Why then is there often such resistance to integration
from members of the advantaged group? Our answer to this question is apparent in the ﬁrs of the
two examples presented in the previous section. In the example depicted in Figure 5, integration
on a large enough scale results in the elimination of negative stereotypes, and drives the economy
to a symmetric equilibrium. The result, however, is that human capital levels and wages decline
in both groups, and as a consequence, both groups are worse oﬀ than under the status quo with
statistical discrimination.
Of course, as the example in Figure 6 demonstrates, the elimination of negative stereotypes as a
consequence of large-scale integration can also result in a symmetric equilibrium where both groups
are better oﬀ than under the status quo. In this section we explore the conditions under which
each of these divergent outcomes is likely to occur. The population share, β, of the disadvantaged
group, and the curvature of neighborhood eﬀects, a,t u r no u tt ob ec r i t i c a l .
We say that integration is welfare-enhancing if it eliminates negative stereotypes and results in
an increase in skill levels in both populations relative to the status quo. It is welfare-reducing if it
eliminates negative stereotypes and results in a decrease in skill levels in both populations.
Theorem 2. For any β ∈ (0,1), integration is welfare-enhancing if a ∈ (amin,a m),a n dw e l f a r e -
reducing if a ∈ (an,a max).
Here am and an are as deﬁned in Theorem 1. Integration eliminates negative stereotypes and is
welfare-enhancing if the beneﬁts of intergroup contact to the disadvantaged group are suﬃciently
21high relative to the costs of such contact to the advantaged group. Similarly, integration eliminates
negative stereotypes and is welfare-reducing if the beneﬁts of intergroup contact to the disadvan-
taged group are suﬃciently small relative to the costs of such contact to the advantaged group. The
result is quite intuitive. When a is small, intergroup contact raises skill shares in the stereotyped
group more signiﬁcantly than it lowers skill shares in the other group. Eventually a threshold is
reached when the costs of human capital accumulation in the former group fall low enough to make
self-fulﬁlling negative stereotypes unsustainable. At this point there is an increase in skill shares
in both groups, although the increase is more rapid and signiﬁcant in the previously stereotyped
group. Eventually even the formerly advantaged group is better oﬀ, since they now experience
positive human capital spillovers from all their neighbors, regardless of group membership. The
reasoning is analogous for the case in which a is large, but the eﬀects work in the opposite direction,
lowering wages, skills and welfare in both groups.
According to Theorem 2, integration eliminates negative stereotypes and is welfare-enhancing
if the parameters a and β lie in the lower-left shaded region in Figure 7. Similarly, integration
eliminates negative stereotypes and is welfare-reducing if the parameters a and β lie in the upper-
right shaded region in Figure 7. An immediate consequence of this is that when a is suﬃciently
small, integration is welfare-enhancing if β is also suﬃciently small. When a is suﬃciently large,
on the other hand, integration is welfare-reducing if β is also suﬃciently large. Speciﬁcally, the
following is implied by Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. For any a ∈ (am(1),a m(0)) integration is welfare-enhancing if β ∈ (0,βl), and for
any a ∈ (an(1),a n(0)) integration is welfare-reducing if β ∈ (βh,1).
Here βl, and βh are as deﬁned in Corollary 1. If the disadvantaged group is a suﬃciently small
minority, both groups can beneﬁt from a policy of integration if negative stereotypes are eliminated
as a result. In this case one might expect widespread popular support for integrationist policies
even within the ranks of the advantaged group. On the other hand, integration may be welfare
reducing for both groups if the initially disadvantaged group is a suﬃciently large majority.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Neighborhood eﬀects (or more broadly, a variety of local complementarities) have featured promi-
nently in analyses of human capital formation. Somewhat surprisingly, such eﬀects have been
22ignored in the literature on statistical discrimination in labor market settings. This is the case even
in that strand of the literature that emphasizes how negative stereotypes might be perpetuated
through the endogenous human capital acquisition decisions of those subject to such beliefs. We
see the statistical discrimination literature and the literature on neighborhood eﬀects in human
capital accumulation as being deeply complementary, and have taken a step towards bridging the
gap between the two.
We did so by introducing neighborhood eﬀects into an otherwise standard model of statisti-
cal discrimination in job assignment. With the introduction of neighborhood eﬀects, the level of
segregation in the economy becomes salient in determining the likelihood and extent of statisti-
cal discrimination. We showed that starting from a situation where statistical discrimination is
prevalent, integration on a large enough scale can, if neighborhood eﬀects operate in a suﬃciently
asymmetric fashion, eliminate negative stereotypes by making it impossible for a stable discrimina-
tory equilibrium to be sustained. Whether this results in a welfare improvement or results instead
in both groups being worse oﬀ than under statistical discrimination depends on the population
share of the initially disadvantaged group and the direction of the asymmetry in the impact of
neighborhood eﬀects. In metropolitan areas in which the stereotyped group is relatively small, and
if human capital spillover eﬀects are most powerful at low levels of skill accumulation, one would
expect vigorous integrationist policies to be both uniformly welfare-enhancing in the long run, and
to enjoy widespread popular support.
23Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Suppose that (sl,s h) is an equilibrium with d =1 . Since d =1 ,σ 1 = sl
and σ2 = sh. Hence equilibrium implies b(sl)=c(sl,s l) and b(sh)=c(sh,s h). Now consider the
symmetric skill allocation (sl,s l) for any level of d ∈ [0,1]. At this allocation σ1 = σ2 = sl regardless
of d. Since b(sl)=c(sl,s l), this must be an equilibrium. An identical argument shows that (sh,s h)
must also be an equilibrium for all d ∈ [0,1]. This proves that (sl,s h) is an equilibrium with d =1
only if (sl,s l) and (sh,s h) are both equilibria for all d ∈ [0,1]. To show that the converse is also
true, note that if (sl,s l) and (sh,s h) are both equilibria for all d ∈ [0,1] then in particular, they
are both equilibria for d =1 . This implies b(sl)=c(sl,s l) and b(sh)=c(sh,s h). Since σ1 = s1 and
σ2 = s2 when d =1 , it follows that (sl,s h) is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Starting from any equilibrium (sl,s h), a decline in segregation will
raise the neighborhood quality experienced by the disadvantaged group and raise the neighborhood
quality experienced by the advantaged group at any state (s1,s 2) that lies within a suﬃciently small
neighborhood of the initial equilibrium. This implies that for any s2 in such a neighborhood, the
value of s1 at which b(s1)=c(s1,σ1) will be higher than it was prior to the decline in segregation.
In other words, the fall in segregation will shift the relevant ˙ s1 =0isocline to the right. Analogous
reasoning may be used to show that the relevant ˙ s2 =0isocline will shift down. If the two isoclines
continue to intersect, there will be a new equilibrium close to the original one, with the following
properties: (i) the original equilibrium will lie in the basin of attraction of the new one, and (ii) the
dynamics of skill shares will satisfy ˙ s2 < 0 < ˙ s1 at the original equilibrium state. Hence a decline
in segregation raises the equilibrium skill share of the disadvantaged group and lowers that of the
advantaged group.
Proof of Theorem 1. First consider all values of a and β such that an asymmetric equilibrium
(sl,s h) exists. We shall show that both sl and sh are decreasing in a and β. Starting from any
equilibrium (sl,s h), an increase in a raises costs c(si,σi) for each group at the original state. Hence
at any state (s1,s 2) that lies within a suﬃciently small neighborhood of the initial equilibrium
(sl,s h) we have c(si,σi) >b (si) and hence ˙ si < 0 for i =1 ,2. This implies that for any s2 in
such a neighborhood, the value of s1 at which b(s1)=c(s1,σ1) will be lower than it was prior
to the increase in a. In other words, the rise in a will shift the relevant ˙ s1 =0isocline to the
left. Analogous reasoning may be used to demonstrate that the relevant ˙ s2 =0isocline will shift
down. If the two isoclines continue to intersect, there will be a new equilibrium close to the original
24one, with the following properties: (i) the original equilibrium will lie in the basin of attraction of
the new one, and (ii) the dynamics of skill shares will satisfy ˙ s1 < 0 and ˙ s2 < 0 at the original
equilibrium state. Hence a rise in a shifts both equilibrium skill shares down. The eﬀects of changes
in β is similar: starting from any equilibrium (sl,s h), an increase in β lowers neighborhood quality
for each group and hence raises costs c(si,σi) for each group at the original state. This is exactly
the eﬀect of an increase in a, so the reasoning used for that case applies also here: a rise in β shifts
both equilibrium skill shares down. Hence both sl and sh are decreasing in a and β.
Let ¯ sxz = βsx+(1−β)sz denote the neighborhood skill share that would prevail under complete
integration at an equilibrium in which (sl,s h)=( sx,s z). Deﬁne am as the value of a at which
γ(¯ sxz)=γx. When a = am,γ (sz) <γ x <γ (sx) so there exists an asymmetric equilibrium under
complete segregation. Hence am ∈ (amin,a max). Note that γ(¯ sxz)=γx implies that c(sx, ¯ sxz)=
0 and c(sz, ¯ sxz)=b(sz). This implies that when a = am, there is an asymmetric equilibrium
(sl,s h)=( sx,s z) under complete integration (d =0 ) . At any a<a m there is no asymmetric
equilibrium under complete integration since, as shown above, sl and sh are both decreasing in a
and sl ∈ [sw,s x] under complete integration. Hence integration eliminates negative stereotypes for
all a ∈ (amin,a m). That am is decreasing in β follows from the deﬁnition of am and the fact that
both sl and sh are decreasing in a and β.
Next let ¯ swy = βsw +( 1− β)sy denote the neighborhood skill share that would prevail under
complete integration at an equilibrium in which (sl,s h)=( sw,s y). Deﬁne an as the value of a
at which γ(¯ swy)=γy. When a = an γ(sw) <γ y <γ (sy) so there exists an asymmetric equilib-
rium under complete segregation. Hence an ∈ (amin,a max). Note that γ(¯ swy)=γy implies that
c(sw, ¯ swy)=0and c(sy, ¯ swy)=b(sy). This implies that when a = an, there is an asymmetric equi-
librium (sl,s h)=( sw,s y) under complete integration (d =0 ) . At any a>a n there is no asymmetric
equilibrium under complete integration since, from Proposition 1, sl and sh both decreasing in a
and sl ∈ [sw,s x] under complete integration. Hence integration eliminates negative stereotypes for
all a ∈ (an,a max). That an is decreasing in β follows from the deﬁnition of an and the fact that
both sl and sh are decreasing in a and β.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . From the proof of Theorem 1, when a = am and d =0there is an
asymmetric equilibrium (sx,s z). Since the lower skill share is decreasing in a and d at asymmetric
equilibria (from Proposition 1), for any a<a m there exists some segregation level ˜ d ∈ (0,1)
such that an asymmetric equilibrium (sl,s h) exists with sl(a,β, ˜ d)=sx and sh(a,β, ˜ d) >s z.
25(This is the segregation level beyond which negative stereotypes are eliminated.) Let Nδ denote a
neighborhood of the equilibrium point (sl,s h) such that the Euclidean distance between any point
in Nδ and the equilibrium (sl,s h) is at most δ. We claim that if δ is suﬃciently small, then at all
points (s1,s 2) ∈ Nδ at which ˙ s1 =0 , we must have s2 ≤ sh. T os e ew h y ,n o t et h a ta ta n y(s1,s 2)
at which s1 ≤ sl and s2 >s h, c(s1,σ1) <b (s1)=0 . This implies that ˙ s1 =0with s2 >s h only if
s1 >s l. However, since sl = sx,c (s1,σ1) <b (s1) for all s1 >s l if s2 >s h, (s1,s 2) ∈ Nδ, and δ is
suﬃciently small. This shows that the isocline ˙ s1 =0does not extend past the isocline ˙ s2 =0at
their intersection (sl,s h). (This is the case depicted in Figure 6). Any decline in d past ˜ d therefore
leaves the economy in the basin of attraction of the symmetric equilibrium in which both groups
have high levels of human capital.
Next consider the case a>a n. From the proof of Proposition 3, when a = an and d =0there is
an asymmetric equilibrium (sw,s y). Since the higher skill share is decreasing in a and increasing in
d at asymmetric equilibria (from Proposition 1), for any a>a n there exists some segregation level
˜ d ∈ (0,1) such that an asymmetric equilibrium (sl,s h) exists with sh(a,β, ˜ d)=sy and sl(a,β, ˜ d) <
sw. (This is the segregation level beyond which negative stereotypes are eliminated.) Let Nδ denote
a neighborhood of the equilibrium point (sl,s h) such that the Euclidean distance between any point
in Nδ and the equilibrium (sl,s h) is at most δ. We claim that if δ is suﬃciently small, then at all
points (s1,s 2) ∈ Nδ at which ˙ s2 =0 , we must have s1 ≥ sl. T os e ew h y ,n o t et h a ta ta n y(s1,s 2)
at which s2 ≥ sh and s1 <s l, c(s2,σ2) >b (s2). This implies that ˙ s2 =0with s1 <s l only if
s2 <s h. However, since sh = sy,c (s2,σ2) >b (s2) for all s2 <s h if s1 <s l, (s1,s 2) ∈ Nδ, and δ
is suﬃciently small. This shows that the isocline ˙ s2 =0does not extend past the isocline ˙ s1 =0
at their intersection at (sl,s h). (This is the case depicted in Figure 5). Any decline in d past ˜ d
therefore leaves the economy in the basin of attraction of the symmetric equilibrium in which both
groups have low levels of human capital.
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